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Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern 
Corporation’s Last Chapter 
William W. Bratton† 
Michael L. Wachter†† 
INTRODUCTION 
Readers game enough to work through all three hundred pages of 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property1 looking for insights on 
corporate law today encounter two, apparently contradictory, lines of 
thought.2  One line, set out in Books II and III, resonates comfortably 
with today’s shareholder-centered corporate legal theory.  Here the book 
teaches that even as ownership and control have separated,3 managers 
should function as trustees for the shareholders and so should exercise 
their wide-ranging powers for the shareholders’ benefit.4  The other line 
of thought emerges in Books I and IV, where The Modern Corporation 
encases this shareholder trust model in discussions of corporate power 
and social welfare.  These discussions resonate today with those who 
advocate corporate social responsibility.  Here, the separation of owner-
ship and control implies public responsibilities: “It is entirely possi-
ble . . . that the corporate profit stream in reality no longer is private 
property, and that claims on it must be adjusted by some test other than 
that of property right.”5 
The two lines of thought come together in the book’s most famous 
sequence, its last chapter, entitled “The New Concept of the Corpora-
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 1. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World, rev. ed. 1968) (1932). 
 2. See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. 
L. 737 (2001). 
 3. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 250–52. 
 4. Id. at 275–77. 
 5. Id. at 219. 
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tion.”6  After the book’s publication, Berle himself suggested that the last 
chapter was what the book was all about—a few pages for the general 
reader “too lazy, busy or uninterested to read three hundred pages of 
academic argument.”7 
Unfortunately, Berle’s commendation is misleading.  Those who 
pick up the book looking for the origins of shareholder primacy reach the 
last chapter only to find the shareholders trumped by the public interest.  
The chapter takes the trust model, painstakingly developed for the share-
holders’ benefit earlier in the book, and redeploys it for the public’s ben-
efit: since the shareholders had given up responsibility for corporate 
property, other constituents should join them as corporate beneficiaries; 
the “[r]igid enforcement of property rights” of passive shareholders 
would give way in the face of a “convincing system of community obli-
gations.”8  Management, moreover, must develop into a “purely neutral 
technocracy.”9  In meeting these technocratic obligations, corporate lead-
ers would be expected to “set forth a program comprising fair wages, 
security to employees, reasonable service to their public, and stabiliza-
tion of business . . . .”10  But, the reader is left to wonder how manage-
ment can be expected to serve as trustee to the shareholders and the pub-
lic simultaneously? 
In our previous work,11 we show that this contradiction can be ex-
plained by reference to the context in which the book was written.  The 
book had a long gestation, spanning the late 1920s, the Crash, and the 
early years of the Great Depression.  Many reordered their political eco-
nomic views during those years, Berle among them.  The Modern Corpo-
ration’s various parts capture Berle at different points in the timeline, 
beginning in the boom years as a friend of the shareholders and ending in 
the depths of the Depression as an advocate of corporate advancement of 
national social welfare policies.  Consequently, the last chapter, written 
to address Depression conditions, stands apart from the sections of the 
book conceived during the brighter years of the 1920s. 
The last chapter speaks to debates over appropriate policy res-
ponses to economic crisis, debates still underway upon the book’s publi-
cation in 1932.  Many looked to Franklin Delano Roosevelt not only to 
win the election, but to follow the lead of many European leaders of the 
                                                 
 6. Id. at 352–57 (bk. IV, ch. IV). 
 7. See JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN 
ERA 63 (1987). 
 8. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 312. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Ori-
gins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008). 
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time and adopt corporatism as the political economy of the United States.  
Berle, who joined FDR’s inner circle during the 1932 campaign, was a 
leading advocate of a corporatist approach.  Our earlier work shows that 
The Modern Corporation’s last chapter extensively overlaps the “New 
Individualism” speech that Berle (and his wife Beatrice) wrote for 
FDR.12  The speech, the most radical of the 1932 campaign,13 presaged 
the economic program of the New Deal, in particular the corporatist Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) enacted in June 1933.14 
But the NIRA proved unsuccessful, and formal corporatism disap-
peared from the American political economy along with it.  Even so, The 
Modern Corporation’s last chapter has maintained a grip on generations 
of readers.  In this essay, we reconsider it and track its later footsteps. 
Our inquiry has three phases.  Part I begins with the last chapter it-
self, explicating its text.  We show that it speaks at two levels: the partic-
ular and the general.  At the particular level, the chapter references com-
munity obligations and neutral technocrats in the political context of 
1932.  It also speaks generally, offering a concept of ongoing corporate-
government cooperation without ties to transitory political events.  It tells 
us that corporations, and by implication corporate law, go to the wider 
political economy for instructions respecting the public interest.  These 
instructions necessarily vary across different contexts and times.  Public 
duties can follow, but the initial onus lies squarely on the public and the 
state to articulate the duties clearly.  The chapter states that there is no 
hard-wired, intrinsic connection between corporate power and any par-
ticular program of public responsibility. 
Part II turns to Berle’s later writings on political economy to see the 
last chapter’s footsteps change direction, but only slightly.  Postwar 
Berle modified his corporatist vision to suit America’s postwar political 
economy.  Corporatism had failed and the regulatory state was the re-
placement.  Where the last chapter looks to immediate redeployment of 
corporate power and resources toward social welfare enhancement, 
postwar Berle situates corporate power in a regulatory state that contains 
it successfully.  The regulatory framework makes it advantageous for 
managers to attend to public demands.  Thus, despite the change of time 
and context, managers retain their status as quasi-public servants re-
quired to attend to public goals. 
                                                 
 12. Davis W. Houck, FDR’s Commonwealth Club Address: Redefining Individualism, Adjudi-
cating Greatness, 7 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 259, 259–60 (2004). 
 13. SCHWARZ, supra note 7, at 79.  The text can be found at the American Rhetoric Online 
Speech Bank, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrcommonwealth.htm. 
 14. Bratton &Wachter, supra note 11, at 109–18. 
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Part III looks at the world post-Berle.  Here the regulatory state re-
treats and market-based controls advance, superannuating Berle’s politi-
cal economy.  We inspect this deregulatory landscape for traces of the 
last chapter, and find them in two distinct locations.  The first is in the 
employment relationship.  There the corporation, as the nation’s primary 
employer, becomes the primary supplier of employee welfare provisions 
preferred by the state.  The two leading examples are corporate offerings 
of health care insurance and retirement security through private pension 
plans.  Both practices became institutionalized during Berle’s lifetime 
and both persist, encouraged by federal tax breaks, but are not otherwise 
mandated.  At the second location, we find new patterns of government-
mandated cooperation with societal goals.  These new demands devolve 
on legal compliance.  In some cases, as with the Foreign Corrupt Practic-
es Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the goal is elimination of corporate 
corruption.  In others, as with the anti-money laundering provisions in 
the Bank Secrecy Act, the corporation serves as the first layer of en-
forcement against corrupt practices by others.  Berle could not have envi-
sioned this development—the footsteps have veered off onto a new trail.  
The track is continuous, however, and today’s corporate compliance re-
gime embodies the last chapter’s precepts. 
I.  THE LAST CHAPTER IN 1932 
Let us pick up the last chapter and read it in the context in which it 
was written.  It begins with a general excursus on private economic pow-
er.  Those who have it desire it.  But they inevitably come into conflict 
with those they affect who wish to redirect the power’s exercise, so as to 
share in its attendant benefits.15  Thus, private economic power triggers 
demands for social response.  Although the conflicts are inevitable, Berle 
and Means write that particular outcomes depend on particular political 
economic contexts: “How will this demand be made effective?  To an-
swer this question would be to foresee the history of the next century.  
We can here only consider and appraise certain of the more important 
lines of possible development.”16 
The chapter then turns to themes developed earlier in the book.  
While the separation of ownership and control disempowers sharehold-
ers, shareholder empowerment does not figure among the political res-
ponses the book envisions.  Berle and Means dismiss shareholders as 
“inactive and irresponsible,” and go on to pose three alternative res-
ponses to corporate power.  First, society could leave managers uncon-
                                                 
 15. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 310. 
 16. Id. at 310. 
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strained, but only if we were ready to face the “danger of a corporate oli-
garchy with the probability of an era of corporate plundering.”17  Second, 
society could cut off management self-dealing by strictly insisting on 
adherence to the shareholder trust.  Third, society could step away from 
the tradition of private property rights and insist on corporations follow-
ing government mandates.18 
The chapter opts for the third alternative, positing a “wholly new 
concept of corporate activity,”19 but following up with little in the way of 
specifics.  Indeed, Berle and Means did not see specification as their job.  
It was up to the community to put forward its demands “with clarity and 
force”20 in the new corporatist state they projected.  The Modern Corpo-
ration had the limited, but necessary job of clearing away the conceptual 
underbrush of property rights.  With the field open, the public could act 
and impose a new regime of government/corporate partnership. 
Such specification that we get does follow the corporatist template.  
Corporatism privileges cooperation over competition and emphasizes 
group over individual interests.21  It assumes that government, through 
consultation with the major groups in society, can articulate an objective-
ly cognizable “public interest.”  Once the public interest is expressed, 
government calls on the various groups, including big business, to adapt 
their positions in support of it.  It follows that corporations are entities 
that operate, in part, as organs of the state.  Corporatism is not social-
ism—capitalism and private property rights are assumed, along with the 
legal model under which directors must maximize the value of the corpo-
ration.  Under corporatism, companies come to a state-directed negotiat-
ing table where they sit down with the state and other interest groups, 
such as labor unions, to determine the public interest.  Given a determi-
nation, the calculus of corporate rights and duties must adjust and recog-
nize a constraint on managerial action in the form of the public interest.22 
Thus, the last chapter tells us that once “a convincing system of 
community obligations is worked out and is generally accepted,” private 
property rights will necessarily have to yield.23  Corporate leaders will 
use their power for social betterment: 
                                                 
 17. Id. at 311. 
 18. Id. at 310–11. 
 19. Id. at 311–12. 
 20. Id. at 312. 
 21. One of us recently has described the corporatist context of the New Deal.  See Michael L. 
Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581 
(2007). 
 22. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 11, at 113–14. 
 23. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 312. 
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Should the corporate leaders . . . set forth a program comprising fair 
wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their public, and 
stabilization of business, all of which would divert a portion of the 
profits from the owners of passive property, and should the commu-
nity generally accept such a scheme as a logical and human solution 
of industrial difficulties, the interests of passive property owners 
would have to give way.24 
Managers are envisioned as “purely neutral” technocrats making al-
locative decisions across groups in society “on the basis of public policy 
rather than private cupidity.”25 
The chapter is as notable for caution as it is for grand political eco-
nomic vision.  It poses corporate social responsibility as an inevitable 
demand, but it does not purport to lock us into a given means of meeting 
that demand.  It tells us only two things.  First, demands for corporate 
social responsibility will emerge so as to suit particular political and so-
cial contexts.  Second, the social demands will have to be clearly and 
forcefully stated, and only then can we expect private property rights to 
yield. 
The last chapter thus poses corporatism only as a possible alterna-
tive.  This is not surprising; the book was written in advance of the na-
tional political decision.  Indeed, it was written before Berle and like-
minded members of the “Brain Trust” captured FDR’s complete atten-
tion.26  Corporatism was not the only available mode of addressing the 
crisis and, even assuming a corporatist initiative, different proponents 
advocated different variations on the theme.27  Berle, desirous of political 
influence himself, was keenly aware that FDR would make the final de-
                                                 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 313.  Berle and Means speculate that the power of corporate actors, once redirected in 
this cooperative direction, could even eclipse that of state actors.  Id.  They do not expand on the 
point.  We do not believe that they were projecting that corporate actors would displace state actors 
at the top of the corporatist pyramid as those responsible for formulating the directives.  More likely, 
they saw corporate actors on the ground effecting allocative decisions in accord with state policy, 
and making judgment calls as they acquitted themselves of their cooperative duties. 
 26. Berle had allies in Ray Moley and Rexford Tugwell. See DONALD R. BRAND, 
CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: A STUDY OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 
74–79 (1988).  But Roosevelt liked to surround himself with advisors espousing competing posi-
tions.  One such advisor was Felix Frankfurter, an old nemesis of Berle’s, see SCHWARZ, supra note 
7, at 14–15, who, along with a cadre of acolytes, still hewed to the economic liberalism of decades 
before.  See id. at 76. 
 27. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 11, at 110 (describing Berle’s “New Freedom” oppo-
nents and their emphasis on trust busting as the means of corporate disempowerment), and at 122–28 
(describing a “New Capitalist” version of corporatism circulating in 1932, with its emphasis on 
management empowerment, and contrasting Berle’s corporatism, which contemplated labor and 
management both would have a place at the government’s corporatist table). 
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cision and was not about to foreclose any options before the fact in a 
book chapter. 
That said, the chapter goes for broke with its vision of a brave new 
world of empowered management technocrats.  The vision needs to be 
contextualized carefully.  Berle and Means’s managers become empo-
wered only if they successfully redirect their resources to maximize so-
cial welfare.  And their power is only that of technocrats—experts who 
effectuate instructions delivered by a government policymaker vested 
with the legitimacy of public office.  There is nothing here for a modern 
proponent of corporate social responsibility in a deregulatory state. 
Nor is there much in The Modern Corporation for modern propo-
nents of shareholder primacy.  Berle retains a reputation as shareholder 
primacy’s grandfather figure because of The Modern Corporation’s 
shareholder trust model.  Even before the book’s publication in 1932, he 
had forcefully advanced the shareholder trust model as an alternative to 
management empowerment in a famous back and forth with E. Merrick 
Dodd on the pages of the Harvard Law Review.28  But, as the last chapter 
shows, Berle saw the shareholder trust model as the alternative to the 
pre-New Deal status quo and its regime of unconstrained management 
self-dealing.  Given the status quo, and absent a big stick state, Berle 
went with the shareholder trust as the least dangerous alternative.29  Giv-
en the state-controlled economy to which the last chapter looked for-
ward, Berle saw things very differently, with the public displacing the 
shareholders as trust beneficiaries and the directors owing their primary 
allegiance to the national interest.  Once a well-articulated public policy 
was established, the directors of the corporation should help society 
achieve the articulated goals.  At that point, shareholders would have to 
take a back seat.  Instead of unrestrained maximization, directors were to 
maximize the corporation’s value  in a way that satisfied societal goals. 
II.  BERLE’S POSTWAR POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The last chapter’s grand vision soon achieved real world manifesta-
tion in the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).  But the NIRA 
                                                 
 28. Berle first set out the book’s shareholder trust model in a law review article.  See Adolf A. 
Berle, Corporate Powers As Powers In Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931).  Dodd responded with 
an attack.  See E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1145 (1932).  Berle then responded to Dodd, defending the shareholder trust model.  See Adolf A. 
Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note In Harvard Law Review, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1365 (1932).  Berle’s response lingers in corporate law’s collective memory as shareholder 
primacy’s ancestral text.  We show that this is a misreading in Bratton & Wachter, supra note 11, at 
122–30.  For a contrasting reading, see Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A 
Theory of Values and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 690–98 (2004). 
 29. For our development of this argument see Bratton & Wachter, supra note 11, at 122–35. 
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quickly fell apart.  It looked to cooperative alliances that never coalesced 
and, absent cooperation, its economic plan foundered due to internal con-
tradictions.  Berle’s grand vision disappeared along with it. 
Berle accepted the result.30  He viewed the NIRA as an experiment, 
years later observing that intervention on such a scale occurred in this 
country only in the event of an emergency.31  Even so, he never aban-
doned corporatism’s underlying economic and political assumptions.  
Nor would he stray from the last chapter’s four general points: (1) de-
mands for corporate social responsibility are inevitable; (2) the demands 
must be stated clearly and forcefully by the public to the state; (3) the 
state must then articulate the regulatory response; and (4) the specific 
content of the demands will vary to suit particular political and social 
contexts. 
Berle went on to show how the four points manifested themselves 
in America’s postwar political context.  He described a strong regulatory 
state that could articulate the social welfare function, guiding and push-
ing the markets to the socially preferred result.  This presupposed the 
cooperative engagement of interested parties.  Berle described a benign 
equipoise amongst strong organizations; one equipoise constrained by a 
wider public consensus that empowered the government. 
Corporate managers emerged in this framework as quasi-public 
servants, roughly approximating the last chapter’s neutral technocrats.  
Whether they liked it or not, corporate managers were accountable to the 
regulatory state, on the one hand, and to the public consensus on the oth-
er.  Failure to satisfy the public meant new regulation; avoidance of new 
regulation meant satisfying the public.  It followed that public duties 
were unavoidable as a practical matter.  Shareholders, in contrast, re-
mained what they were in the last chapter—passive investors with no 
productive role to play in the political economy.  As we will see, these 
characterizations were context specific. 
Section A sets out Berle’s description of the post-New Deal politi-
cal economic status quo.  Section B goes on to Berle’s picture of capital-
ist economy and the state’s planning role.  Section C takes up Berle’s 
description of a political equilibrium grounded in public consensus.  Sec-
tion D turns to managers and shareholders. 
                                                 
 30. He outlined a number of dysfunctional aspects of the regime’s operation in a report he 
prepared in July 1934.  ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, 1918–1971; FROM THE 
PAPERS OF ADOLF A. BERLE 99–101 (Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs, eds. 1973) [he-
reinafter BERLE, RAPIDS]. 
 31. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954) [hereinaf-
ter BERLE, 20TH CENTURY]. 
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A.  The American Economic Republic 
For postwar Berle, the events of 1933 had constitutional signific-
ance.  Before 1933, the economy and the polity were separated, with the 
economy left to go its automatic way; but, to Berle, the “open market” 
could not prevent destructive business cycles—”[i]t was not designed 
to . . . .”32  Catastrophe had resulted, leading to a fundamental shift dur-
ing the Hundred Days: 
The 1929 crash, the slow recovery of 1930, and the ensuing spiral 
descent into an abyss of unemployment, bank failures, and commer-
cial paralysis was not corrected by market processes.  The contem-
porary business captains, working desperately (as they did) to meet 
the situation, failed completely.  Following established precepts of 
the American political process, the public . . . increasingly asked 
that the political state propose a program and act.  Necessarily, this 
meant considerable reorganization of private business. . . .  Out of 
the crisis was born the American economic republic as we know it 
today.33 
Although the NIRA had failed, the state and the economy nonethe-
less emerged in the “American economic republic” as interdependent, 
with the state taking ultimate responsibility for economic results and ex-
ercising the higher level of power.34  The old economic order, with its 
private property regime, persisted35 and, incentivized by the profit mo-
tive, took care of the production.36  The state had intervened only to sta-
bilize the capitalist system.37  More extensive intervention in the form of 
full blown corporatism complete with state economic institutions had 
been avoided, but only because sophisticated private actors had learned 
to play by the new rules.  They had seen that the state’s regulatory power 
took precedence over their own economic power.  The private actors ac-
cordingly restrained exercise of their own power for the sake of its pre-
servation.38  This restraint permitted the state to reserve exercise of its 
full regulatory power as a deterrent, rarely resorting to direct insistence 
on positive action. 
                                                 
 32. ADOLF A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC 82 (1963) [hereinafter BERLE, 
REPUBLIC]. 
 33. Id. at 91. 
 34. Id. at 95. 
 35. Id. at 99. 
 36. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 94 (1959) [hereinafter BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY]. 
 37. BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 32, at 99.  Keynes, said Berle, had shown that the state could 
“stabilize, stimulate and direct” the economy without assuming dictatorial powers and without ab-
olishing private property.  Id. at 5. 
 38. Id. at 169. 
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B.  Economic Planning 
For Berle, the economic conditions that brought about the Depres-
sion were intrinsic to capitalism.  The industrial production machine, he 
asserted, could bring forth limitless goods, a capacity that had been 
achieved for the first time in human history in the mid-1920s.39  But, 
there was a persistent problem—overcapacity gave management the dis-
cretion to set the level of production wherever it wanted; at the same 
time, labor tended toward oversupply.  This problem led to an unpalata-
ble either/or: either too many goods were produced or unemployment 
was too high.40  The solution to this problem lay in a planned equation of 
supply to demand that would hopefully generate greater economic stabil-
ity.41 
Satisfying the preference for economic stability called for economic 
regulation.  Although the NIRA was gone, industry-specific regulatory 
mechanisms, for the most part dating from the New Deal, remained in 
place over banking, ground and air transport, public utilities, broadcast-
ing, petroleum, and shipping.42  These mechanisms controlled entry, exit, 
and prices, operating as miniature, industry-specific NIRAs with the twin 
aims of preventing excessive competition and promoting constituent co-
operation.43 
In other industries, Berle looked in part to oligopoly to perform the 
planning function.  Rather than being a cause of instability, the concen-
tration of economic power, could be harnessed to dampen it, and increas-
ing concentration (and oligopoly conditions) remained the way of the 
future.44  The balancing of supply and demand at fair prices by actors in 
concentrated industries required government oversight.45  Whenever 
                                                 
 39. ADOLF A. BERLE, POWER 176 (1969).  Berle expressed no concerns about incentives to 
innovate within big firms—there was no way to tell whether development worked better inside or 
outside; the important thing was that the capital was there inside.  Id. at 209–14. 
 40. BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 32, at 78–79.  Berle observed that, absent regulation, condi-
tions in 1962 resembled those of 1930, heralding another depression.  Id. at 217. 
 41. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 31, at 11–12. 
 42. Id. at 49. 
 43. Wachter, supra note 21, at 607–10. 
 44. He regularly brought to date The Modern Corporation’s figures on industrial concentration.  
Unfortunately for Berle’s track record as a prognosticator, things had not worked out quite as pre-
dicted.  The book had projected that the largest 200 firms would account for 70% of production.  By 
1962, however, they supplied only 40%.  BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 32, at 149.  For earlier up-
dates, see BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 31, at 27; BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra 
note 36, at 18.  Berle sidestepped accordingly, lowering the bar and stressing that in 1962 the largest 
400 to 500 firms did account for 60% to 70% of production.  BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 32, at 
149. 
 45. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 31, at 47–48.  See also BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 
32, at 102–03.  New industries would come into the system when they grew large enough to have an 
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pricing power was abused or the public came to deem its exercise unac-
ceptable in a given segment—or, alternatively, competition broke out 
with destructive effects46—regulation or informal intervention could be 
expected, with informal means being preferred.47 
Berle addressed his critique of the capitalist system to the perfectly 
competitive state envisioned by classical economics.  He never integrated 
into his thinking the neoclassical theory that emerged after World War II, 
which in its first iteration envisioned a stable environment with oligopo-
listic markets, and later envisioned a stable environment with contestable 
markets.  Berle thus failed to appreciate the private system’s inherent 
equilibrating capability.  Having lived through the Great Depression, 
which only ended with the military buildup prior to the United States’ 
entry into World War II, his pessimism is understandable. 
C.  Political Processes and Controls 
Berle built his political economy around two points.  We have just 
seen the first: state economic management could not be avoided.  We 
turn now to the second: the state manager would approximate the ideal of 
a benign maximizer. 
There was, said Berle, no problem of a Leviathan state, at least in 
the American context.  Government actors assumed new economic plan-
ning functions only reluctantly, because of the political costs of failed 
policy and the lack of upside benefits.48  Intervention thus presupposed 
private sector failure or abuse, and informal intervention was preferred to 
formal regulation.49  If anything in American politics worried him, it was 
persistent, anti-statist objections to government intervention, which in his 
view failed to recognize the danger posed when private actors wielded 
concerted economic power.50 
For Berle, then, the American political state had learned to take a 
pragmatic and flexible approach to economic management, hewing to the 
premise of a free society and eschewing grand theories.51  Berle little 
                                                                                                             
impact on public welfare.  At that point, stabilization plans would have to be worked out, with the 
unions cooperating.  Id. at 159–60. 
 46. Id. at 160. 
 47. Id. at 41, 103.  See also BERLE, POWER, supra note 39, at 201 (noting price policing by 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson).  Here Berle was open to a more explicit corporatist reform, advo-
cating a postwar proposal made by Means for a government board that would monitor the “economic 
performance” (as opposed to the profitability) of all large firms and intervene as needed.  BERLE, 
REPUBLIC, supra note 32, at 161. 
 48. BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 32, at 67. 
 49. Id. at 41. 
 50. See BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 36, at 124–25. 
 51. BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 32, at 15. 
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concerned himself with political process.52  European theories of corpo-
ratist organization do not register in his postwar writing—there are no 
elaborate structures of groups and lines of political input.  Nor does 
postwar American pluralism fully register.  Interest group pluralism 
made Berle suspicious because it assumed good results from competition 
in pursuit of self-interested goals and failure to cooperate.53 
Berle did, however, acknowledge that interest group competition 
could have the beneficial effect of preventing acquisition of excessive 
power in any one interest.54  It is at this level that Berle identified a plu-
ralism he could embrace, a pluralism consistent with his preference for 
cooperation: the multiplicity of empowered institutions—states, firms, 
and labor unions—had emerged in interdependent “equipoise,” an equi-
librium relationship in which no single institution had been permitted to 
assume more than a handful of functions.55  Berle thought the balance 
worked well. 
It followed that political process did matter in Berle’s theorizing, 
but only at a very general level.  The “clear social demands”56 hypothe-
sized in the last chapter now manifested themselves in the apparatus of 
public consensus.  The public consensus in turn legitimized the exercise 
of power.57  Empowered actors, whether private or public, were expected 
to voluntarily observe the standards stated in the consensus.58  The con-
sensus in turn reflected prevailing customs respecting fair and equitable 
outcomes.59 
While Berle can be called a political economist, he was not a politi-
cal theorist.  His postwar writings take the political economic landscape 
of the Eisenhower and Kennedy eras and describe it at a high level of 
generality.  While he projected this picture forward in time, time would 
prove the projection inaccurate.  Nor would political theory remain sup-
                                                 
 52. Berle did have a theory of “political forces.”  ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., NATURAL SELECTION 
OF POLITICAL FORCES 17 (rev. ed. 1968) (1950).  This abstracted from Western history to offer a 
vision of natural selection of different political regimes.  Id. at 17–18.  “Good” regimes built on 
coherent ideologies and directed to taking people to “safety and survival” had superior evolutionary 
fitness.  Id. at 86.  What a political theorist today might call “process,” Berle called “apparatus,” 
attaching an open-ended definition: “the entire range of method, from persuasion and emotion to 
force, . . . by which groups are held together.”  Id. at 24.  The better the political force, the more 
would its apparatus sustain it effectively over time.  Id. at 24–25. 
 53. Berle denounced planning directed towards the defense of special interests as irresponsible.  
BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 32, at 127. 
 54. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 36, at 92. 
 55. Id. at 88. 
 56. Id. at 127. 
 57. In Berle’s view, the American public’s value system—“vast, silent, nonestablished but still 
regnant”—was the polity’s essential organizing force.  BERLE, POWER, supra note 39, at 294. 
 58. BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 32, at 41. 
 59. Id. at 42–43. 
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portive.  Later political theories describe frictions that prevent the formu-
lation of the stable political consensus on which he grounded his political 
economy.  Absent a stable consensus, there is no source of instructions 
for managers to follow in their quasi public capacity or, in the last chap-
ter’s terms, no “clear articulation.” 
D.  Corporate Power 
Recall that the last chapter envisions managers as “purely neutral” 
technocrats who make allocative decisions “on the basis of public policy 
rather than private cupidity”60 and dismisses the shareholders from its 
political economic picture owing to their inactivity and irresponsibility.  
Postwar-Berle backed away from the neutral technocracy, but as the dis-
cussion that follows will show, public duties retained a central place in 
his description of corporate managers.  Meanwhile, his description of 
shareholders underwent expansion but did not change in substance. 
1.  The Political Position of Management 
The Modern Corporation was written before 1933 and, in that con-
text, Berle had seen collectivized corporate power as a problem.  The 
shift from an atomized economy in which no individual could direct the 
actions of another meant something entirely different in the American 
economic republic.  Managers, of course, remained where they had been 
in The Modern Corporation—atop self-perpetuating corporate oligar-
chies with close to absolute power,61 at least as compared to other inter-
est holders in the firm.  Now, however, the power stemming from the 
concentration of productive functions in the hands of a few provided the 
means to realize a planned economy.62 
Ironically, reliance on a planned economy improved management’s 
position.  At the time of The Modern Corporation, Berle thought that 
corporate power implied legitimacy problems for managers.  Now, in 
contrast, managers legitimized themselves in the de facto corporatist 
framework Berle called the equipoise of strong organizations.  Within 
the equipoise, corporate power was constrained by the need to profit,63 
by the residuum of competition within oligopolies, by the labor unions 
and, given misuse of power or a crisis, by the state.64  Public opinion—
the consensus—influenced all of these, operating slowly but, in the long 
                                                 
 60. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 312–13. 
 61. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 31, at 180. 
 62. Id. at 32, 34–35. 
 63. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 36, at 90. 
 64. Id. at 89–92; BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 31, at 53–59. 
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run, determinatively.65  It also bore on managers directly; for managers, 
as for politicians, violation of community values implied a loss of pres-
tige.  The corporation thus did have a conscience, one imposed by the 
community outside.66 
The corporate manager emerged as a “non-Statist civil servant,”67 a 
non-state actor nonetheless subject to the consent of the governed.68  
Problems could result—a manager could be caught by surprise between 
the emergent public consensus and the responsive state, grappling in the 
unfamiliar territory of political accountability.69  If corporations had the 
power to address a matter and the public demand registered, failure to 
take responsibility meant a forfeiture of power to the state.70  The best 
defense was a satisfied American public and, happily, the U.S. public 
imposed no unreasonable demands (unlike that in other countries). 
2.  The Role of Shareholders 
Berle never abandoned his trust model of corporate law.  Even so, 
corporate law, which lay at the center of The Modern Corporation, 
dropped to secondary status in Berle’s postwar political economy.  It was 
simply not a very important mode of regulation in the big stick regulato-
ry state.  Management, already constrained by federal regulations, only 
needed to be constrained on the margin by the state corporate law appa-
ratus.71  Indeed, Berle approved of postwar extensions of the protection 
of the business judgment rule.72 
Berle left the shareholders in the marginal position to which the last 
chapter had consigned them, expanding on the point by reference to de-
velopments in the capital markets.  For Adam Smith, the capital markets 
had the means to penalize inefficient managers and retain the final say 
respecting new deployments of capital.  Now, the capital function had 
passed to the investing firm itself.  Berle pointed out in 1954 that during 
the preceding six years, 64% of invested capital had been financed by 
                                                 
 65. Id. at 53–57. 
 66. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 36, at 90–91. 
 67. Id. at 8. 
 68. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 31, at 59–60. 
 69. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 36, at 8. 
 70. BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 31, at 172–73. 
 71. So far as labor was concerned, Berle strongly supported the institution of collective bar-
gaining, but viewed unions that took advantage of a strategic position to extort special benefits by 
wielding the strike weapon as little better than gangsters.  Here too, state intervention was necessary, 
but only as the occasion arose.  BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 32, at 167–78. 
 72. See BERLE, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 31, at 179–80. 
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retained earnings and only 6% from new equity.73  It followed that the 
stock exchanges no longer served primarily as places of investment and 
capital allocation, traditional functions only implicated in the rare in-
stance of a new issue of common stock.74 
The shareholders, earlier thrown up against Dodd as a countervail-
ing interest, dropped out of the governance picture.  Federal bureaucrats 
now did the law enforcement.  The annual election of directors played a 
minimal legitimating role in the wider political framework—a ritualized 
community process pursuant to a hoary legal template.75  Proxy fights, a 
recent development in the 1950s, did not imply renewed empowerment 
for equity capital.  Although always a possibility, interventions by proxy 
contestants would be rare and would tend to involve smaller firms.76  
With bigger firms, the vote was getting ever more dispersed, further di-
minishing its importance and embedding passivity.77 
All of this caused Berle to pose fundamental questions: 
Why have stockholders?  What contribution do they make, entitling 
them to heirship of half the profits of the industrial system . . . ?  
Stockholders toil not, neither do they spin, to earn that reward.  
They are beneficiaries by position only.  Justification for their inhe-
ritance must be sought outside classic economic reasoning. 78 
Passive property holders who wielded no power still might be socially 
justified for their distributive role in the polity.  The shareholders used 
their wealth to provide for their families, pay their taxes, and support 
charitable institutions.79  But there was a catch: full justification for the 
shareholder interest would follow only when shareholder wealth became 
so widely distributed as to benefit every American family.80 
                                                 
 73. Id. at 37–39 (acknowledging exceptions for utilities and new industries).  See also BERLE, 
POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 36, at 45 (noting that 10% or 15% of new capital came 
from pension funds and insurance companies and 20% from bank borrowing). 
 74. Adolf Berle, Property, Production and Revolution: A Preface to the Revised Edition of 
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY, at xxvi-ii (Harcourt, Brace & World, rev. ed. 1968) (1932) [hereinafter Berle, 1968 In-
troduction].  It followed that “productive property” needed to be subdivided into two classes.  First 
came the layer controlled by the managers.  Although managers served as the passive owners’ “rep-
resentatives,” id. at xi, it was subjection to outside political processes that made their decisions legi-
timate.  Liquid capital made up the other layer, a layer passive so far as concerned ownership of the 
production function but actively managed to earn returns through interest, dividends, or other return 
of profits.  Id.  Here too regulation had followed—the federal securities laws protected liquidity and 
the integrity of the market price.  Id. at xxi. 
 75. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 36, at 104–05. 
 76. Id. at 63.  See also BERLE, POWER, supra note 39, at 260. 
 77. Berle, 1968 Introduction, supra note 74, at xix. 
 78. Id. at xxiii. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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Berle entered a caveat to this description.  He noticed that more and 
more stock had been accumulating in pension funds, insurance company 
vaults, and mutual funds.  These institutions constituted a new nucleus of 
power, a small oligarchy that potentially could exercise power over man-
agement as it accumulated and deployed risk capital.81  All the share-
holding institutions needed to do was combine and use the proxy process, 
ignoring management’s slates and substituting their own.82  But they 
were not yet exercising this power, instead following the Wall Street rule 
and opting for exit over voice.  For the moment, then, public opinion re-
mained the more effective check on managers than shareholder opi-
nion.83  The picture could change if the institutions woke up and exerted 
power over management tenure, ending management’s self-perpetuating 
oligarchy. 
If Berle did not predict the emergence of activist institutional 
shareholding, he at least identified it as a possibility and so was a step 
ahead of his time.  But when such institutions finally did appear, they 
had the effect of, in part, unwinding Berle’s separation of ownership and 
control and the problems it creates. 
That said, it is likely that Berle would modify his framework only 
slightly to accommodate today’s institutional investors.  He would simp-
ly say that one set of oligarchs—the managers—was being replaced by 
another institutional oligarchy—money managers—and that the problem 
of public accountability remained unaddressed.  Here again we see that 
shareholder primacy was not Berle’s loadstone.  His goal remained the 
insertion of the public interest into the corporate calculus. 
E.  Summary 
Late Berle expanded the themes of the last chapter into a general 
political economy, picking up where The Modern Corporation had left 
off.  Although sensitive to context and new developments, Berle filtered 
them through a static framework set by the politics and economics of the 
New Deal.  He interrogated, but dismissed, new thinking in market eco-
nomics, never contemplating that private markets can make institutional 
adjustments to resolve their own problems.  To Berle, the political equi-
librium that favored state planning would endure because markets always 
failed, and that was that. 
Corporate legal theory today is about “governance,” a phenomenon 
in which postwar Berle displayed little interest.  For him, the central 
                                                 
 81. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 36, at 49–51, 53. 
 82. Id. at 53, 55–56. 
 83. Id. at 53, 55. 
2010] Tracking Berle's Footsteps 865 
problem was not insuring that managers acted on behalf of shareholders; 
instead, the central problem was to get managers to act in the sharehold-
ers’ interest with the binding constraint that managerial decision making 
had to take into account the dictates of public policy.  If that were ac-
complished, shareholders would have no public policy role to play.  
Their interest will become a part of the policy discussion only to the ex-
tent that shareholdings become sufficiently dispersed as to merge the 
shareholder and public interest into one.  This has never happened. 
III.  THE LAST CHAPTER AFTER BERLE 
The last chapter tells us that demands for corporate social respon-
siveness are inevitable and that political and social particulars will vary 
with the context; and so they have in the years since Berle’s death in 
1971.  The regulatory state on which Berle based his postwar theory of 
corporate power began its retreat soon thereafter, disrupting the benign 
equipoise he pictured.  For example, Berle, writing in 1963, had appro-
vingly cited President Kennedy’s recent intervention between the steel 
companies and the United Steel Workers84 as an example of the enduring 
corporatist state.  No one knew it at the time, but that would be the last 
industrial labor dispute settled by the big stick state making threats to 
corporate actors who failed to comply.85  The last adoption of an econo-
my-wide corporatist policy came with the wage and price controls that 
the Nixon Administration imposed between 1971 and 1974.86  Thereaf-
ter, the industry-specific regulatory framework of the New Deal was 
rolled back, piece by piece.87 
The United States jettisoned the big stick state for a political econ-
omy that relied on competitive forces to produce the greatest wealth, not 
only for shareholders, but also for society in general.  Were we to close 
our account at this point, the last chapter of The Modern Corporation 
would be in partial, if not full, eclipse.  As the new political economy 
emerged, Berle’s vision of corporate participation in the achievement of 
national social objectives within a corporatist framework disintegrated.  
To Berle, the state, rather than the markets, would be the agent of 
change.  He did not project a picture of management duties in a deregu-
lated state. 
The framework for identifying and addressing corporate problems 
changed as the regulatory state retreated.  The problem of management 
power continued to hold the center stage, but was reframed as a matter of 
                                                 
 84. BERLE, REPUBLIC, supra note 32, at 168–69. 
 85. See Wachter, supra note 21, at 614–15. 
 86. Id. at 616. 
 87. Id. at 618–20. 
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incentive alignment.  In addition, shareholder value maximization came 
to be seen as a proxy for optimal economic results, situating the share-
holder interest at the economic margin.88  Under this emerging view, 
management in the shareholder interest maximizes value, partly as a mat-
ter of correct incentive alignment,89 and partly because the financial mar-
kets where shareholders set the price came to be viewed as better deploy-
ers of corporate assets than actors in management suites.90 
The model, now seen in agency terms, included structural barriers 
that prevented the shareholder principals from controlling the manager 
agents.  It followed that the structure of the board of directors needed 
revision to make the board an effective monitor of management perfor-
mance.91  There followed movement toward a more vital, independent 
board—a shift that occurred largely as a matter of private initiative.92  
The process apparatus, now termed “corporate governance,” followed, 
channeling the operation of the independent board through an ever-
expanding list of best practices.  Together, these constrain management 
power ever more.  Thus the task of management power containment, 
which Berle assigned to the big stick state, has been privatized. 
Comes the question: What role does the corporation play in society 
in a political economy built around competitive outcomes and private 
value maximization?  One possible answer is that the corporation does 
not play a social role, its sole function being maximization of the value 
of the shareholder interest.  But that answer only gives rise to another 
question: How does a society that grounds its political economy in com-
petitive markets go about achieving social goals? 
                                                 
 88. Michael Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agen-
cy Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976), began a new line of microeconomic 
theory that succeeded where classical microeconomics stopped short, modeling the governance of 
large firms with separate ownership and control as incidents of contracting among rational economic 
actors. 
 89. See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 12–16 (1996) (describing 
the corporation as a “capital” or “shareholders cooperative”); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985) (emphasizing transaction costs); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE 
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 184 (1996) (arguing that shareholders have residual claimant status 
with respect to both earnings and asset liquidation); Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 
93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210 (1984) (emphasizing shareholder vulnerability). 
 90. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the 
United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 122 (Spring 2001). 
 91. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 162–85 (1976).  Eisenberg synthesized and materially advanced a generation of thinking 
about deficiencies of the received legal model of the corporation.  Id.  Eisenberg’s monitoring model 
of the board of directors has ever since been the main focus of legal corporate governance. 
 92. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empower-
ment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 677–81 (2010) (describing private sector containment of management 
power). 
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The surprising answer is that the corporation plays a highly salient 
role in achieving social goals, even in the new political economy.  The 
reason is that the large corporation, a newly emerging phenomenon when 
Berle and Means wrote The Modern Corporation, grew into a ubiquitous 
social institution.  It did so because it proved a highly productive me-
chanism; indeed, it creates most of society’s increasing wealth. 
The large corporation’s ubiquity and productivity together made it 
the logical institution to provide many of the economic items in the so-
cial welfare function and even to join with government as a regulatory 
enforcer.  Indeed, given a political economy that relies on the market 
mechanism, there was no other option. 
We fill in this picture of a corporate service provision below.  Sec-
tion A looks at the corporation’s provision of health care and pensions, 
two examples of corporate provision of socially valued goods in the de-
regulatory era.  Section B shows that corporations have been deputized 
as law enforcers.  While Berle neither recommended nor predicted this 
development, it neatly fits the picture articulated in The Modern Corpo-
ration’s last chapter. 
A.  The Corporation as Social Insurer: Health Care and Pensions 
Nineteenth century corporations were uninvolved in providing 
health care and pensions for individual employees.93  This changed in the 
1910s when a few corporations undertook “welfare work,” which in-
cluded providing limited health care and pensions for their employees.94  
The benefits, however, were less extensive than those commonly pro-
vided today, with unsecured insurance coverage and “informal” pension 
benefits.95  Some corporations made these efforts on the theory that bene-
fits increased employee loyalty to the company, but the practice was not 
widespread.96 
Employer health and pension provision increased dramatically be-
ginning in the late 1920s and early 1930s, with the growth trajectory con-
tinuing to the 1950s.  In a 1935 study, the National Industrial Conference 
Board found that health insurance provisions increased from 16% to 34% 
                                                 
 93. See Frank R. Dobbin, The Origins of Private Social Insurance: Public Policy and Fringe 
Benefits in America, 1920–1950, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1416, 1417 (1992). 
 94. See id. (discussing “welfare work” programs in firms such as General Electric, U.S. Steel, 
Pullman, and International Harvester). 
 95. See id. (citing STUART D. BRANDES, AMERICAN WELFARE CAPITALISM, 1880–1940 (1976) 
(discussing “informal” pension programs where employers paid into mutual benefit associations, 
which “maintained contributory employee-financed funds that paid benefits to injured and ill em-
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 96. Id. (citing JILL QUADAGNO, THE TRANSFORMATION OF OLD AGE SECURITY: CLASS IN 
POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE ch. 4 (1988)). 
868 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
of large employers between 1928 and 1935 and that employer-provided 
pensions increased from 2% to 13% among large employers over the 
same time period.97  Institutional stability came with the growth—
companies maintained the vast majority of these programs even through 
the Depression98—with mechanisms more akin to today’s benefit pro-
grams.  Health coverage included guaranteed payment for illness-related 
work absences and was sometimes supplemented by more extensive 
medical coverage.99  Pension programs were mainly comprised of contri-
butions to private insurance programs, with benefits calculated based on 
years of service.100 
Corporate welfare provision became more thorough-going and, in-
deed, assumed its contemporary institutional shape during the late New 
Deal and World War II.  Different accounts of this development focus on 
different factors.  Some cite labor shortages in key industries101—
particularly those involving firm-specific skills where reducing turnover 
most dramatically reduced costs.102  Others emphasize industrial factors 
during the wartime years, particularly the growth in firm size.103  Still, 
others focus on company relationships with unions, associating the pas-
sage of the Wagner Act with union gains and a consequent increase in 
provision.104  A contrasting line of explanation looks to public policy 
during the 1930s and 1940s.  Proponents of this view argue that the in-
crease in benefit programs during this time was a result of the excess-
profits tax (making it less costly for firms to provide such benefits), the 
wartime wage freeze (leading firms to use non-wage benefits as a means 
                                                 
 97. Id. at 1426–27 (citing NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, WHAT EMPLOYERS 
ARE DOING FOR EMPLOYEES 11 (1936)). 
 98. Id. at 1417; see also id. at 1426–27 (stating that the NICB’s 1935 study “found that only 
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sion”) (citing NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 97, at 11). 
 99. Id. at 1417 (citing MARQUIS JAMES, THE METROPOLITAN LIFE: A STUDY IN BUSINESS 
GROWTH 263 (1947); NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
INDUSTRIAL GROUP INSURANCE 13 (1934)). 
 100. See id. 
 101. Id. at 1418 (citing SUMNER SLICHTER, POTENTIALS OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: 
SELECTED ESSAYS OF SUMNER H. SLICHTER (1961)). 
 102. Id. (citing PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND 
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ORGANIZATIONS (1971); D.S. Pugh, et al., Dimensions of Organizational Structure, 14 ADMIN. SCI. 
Q. 91 (1969)). 
 104. Id. (citing IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
WORKER, 1933–1941 (1972); BRANDES, supra note 95; DAVID BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL 
AMERICA (1980); SANFORD JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1900–1945 (1985)). 
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of reducing turnover), and the tax exemptions for pensions and health 
care under the Revenue Act of 1942 and IRS provisions issued in 
1943.105 
Whatever causal factor one chooses to emphasize, it is clear that the 
corporation assumed a focal-point role in welfare provision in the corpo-
ratist political economy ushered in by the New Deal.  Given that, the ab-
sence of direct federal mandate is unsurprising.  The Wagner Act empo-
wered the unions, and the managers went to the new bargaining table 
with an eye to the government’s interest in peaceful workplaces and the 
constant possibility of new regulatory intervention.  Welfare provision 
followed naturally in this structure of enforced cooperation, a structure 
presaged in The Modern Corporation’s last chapter. 
If there is a puzzle here, it goes to the persistence of the corpora-
tion’s focal-point role in welfare provision.  In the 1950s, corporations 
altered their political position to favor expansion of Social Security pro-
vision and to de-emphasize private provision.106  But employer provision 
of health and pension coverage did not decline in response.  Levels of 
employer coverage underwent only modest shifts in subsequent years.107 
No doubt some of the factors cited in accounts of the rise of corpo-
rate welfare provision also figure into the practice’s persistence, even as 
union power has, for the most part, declined in importance with the de-
                                                 
 105. Id. at 1418–19 (citing LOUISE ILSE, GROUP INSURANCE AND EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT 
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1420–21. 
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 Pension coverage declined in the 1980s among some groups; but the proportion of employers 
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health benefits available to part-time employees.  Id. at 132. 
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cline of the union share of private employment.  Notably, the Internal 
Revenue Code makes health insurance premiums deductible as corporate 
business expenses108 and tax exempt for employees.109  Assuming that 
Internal Revenue Service rules are constructed to serve social goals, we 
see how the ubiquitous presence of corporations as employers can serve 
as the vehicle to realize social goals. 
The Modern Corporation’s last chapter projects that “the great eco-
nomic organisms [will] be made to accept responsibility for the well-
being of those who are subject to the organization, whether workers, in-
vestors, or consumers.” 110  We see that, so far as concerns the employ-
ment relationship, this projection has been borne out.  The ubiquitous 
corporation has become the vehicle of choice to realize social priorities 
for the working population.  Berle wanted the government to state the 
priorities and management to assimilate those priorities into their busi-
ness plans as corporate objectives.  This want, in effect, has occurred, but 
without the big stick state that Berle thought was necessary. 
B.  The Corporation as Law Enforcer: Mandated Compliance 
Read minimally, the last chapter tells us that, given corporate pow-
er, the public will address demands for corporate responsiveness to the 
state and that private property rights will not afford a defense to demands 
thus addressed.  The last chapter grappled with the demands being made 
in the wake of the Great Depression.  After Berle, lesser economic re-
verses triggered new demands on several occasions: in the mid-1970s, 
after Enron, and again in 2008.  In the first two cases, scandals crystal-
lized the demands, and Congress responded by passing the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA)111 and the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX).112  As befits new regulation in a deregulatory era, neither 
act went into great detail about the economic substance of corporate 
management, even though both constrained management power. 
The FCPA stemmed from the Watergate investigations of 1973–74.  
The special prosecutor discovered corporate political slush funds that 
evaded normal accounting controls.113  Payments included illegal domes-
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tic political contributions and bribes to officials abroad—termed “ques-
tionable foreign payments”—made in connection with the sale of Ameri-
can goods and services.114  A voluntary disclosure program instituted by 
the SEC115 resulted in admissions by over 400 companies implicating 
$300 million in questionable payments.116  Agitated by the media, the 
public was disgusted with corruption in government.117  In response, 
Congress demanded a clean-up of corruption in corporate America.118 
The FCPA prohibited bribery of foreign officials, making the 
“questionable” payments illegal.  More importantly for present purposes, 
it mandated internal compliance systems, amending the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 to go deeply into corporate internal affairs, imposing 
record-keeping and internal control requirements on reporting firms.119  It 
was said to amount to the most extensive application of federal law to the 
regulation of corporations since 1934.120 
The scenario acted out in the mid-1970s was repeated in 2002 in the 
wake of reporting failures at Enron, WorldCom, and other firms.  Two 
ingredients once again registered: headline-grabbing stories of corporate 
corruption and popular anger towards corporate management.  Congress 
again passed legislation intended to “rein in” corporations—the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002.121 
Some of the SOX mandates pick up where the FCPA left off, ad-
dressing the integrity of the disclosure system.  For example, SOX re-
quires that the CEO and CFO certify public reports, making them re-
sponsible for the maintenance of the firm’s internal controls system122 
and subject to accompanying criminal penalties.123  Other provisions of 
SOX draw on processes specified in the corporate governance book of 
best practices, locking them in as mandates.124 
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Both statutes strengthen the federal truth-telling regime, responding 
to compliance failures by pushing federal regulation beyond the financial 
reports themselves, to the process of data collection.  Both concern com-
pliance with law (or in the case of “questionable payments,” quasi law).  
In effect, the federal government, having instituted the mandatory disclo-
sure system, reacted to successive compliance failures by reaching fur-
ther and further back inside of corporations to cover the processes that 
generate the mandated reports.  Both statutes responded to political de-
mands and appeared when high profile noncompliance combined with 
economic reverses.  In both cases, the political demands stemmed from 
the general public rather than from organized interest groups.  Both sta-
tutes draw on a non-ideological source, the corporate governance agenda.  
Indeed, both “surmounted partisan politics in the course of their enact-
ment.”125 
In sum, both statutes exemplify the last chapter’s point about corpo-
rate power and public demands.  They both flow from an ongoing media-
tion between corporate power—now manifested in the insiders’ informa-
tional superiority—and the outside economy—now protected by disclo-
sure rules.  And, just as the last chapter predicts, the state traverses the 
public/private divide as the mediation proceeds. 
The FCPA and SOX extend the penetration of public enforcement 
considerably into the private sphere, forcing corporations to participate 
directly in the enforcement enterprise.  The mandatory aspect of this de-
putization looms large in the imagination.  Most people, when they look 
at compliance systems, see a new layer of mandated costs—the big stick 
state in raw form, the public pounding the private.  But something else 
also is at work here: a corporate compliance officer is a cop, a private 
sector cop pursuing a public goal.  The state mandates the officer’s pres-
ence (indeed, it mandates a whole corporate department) to make sure 
the empowered actors inside the corporation cooperate with the public’s 
clearly stated legal compliance demands.  The compliance officer accor-
dingly exercises delegated public authority, harnessing corporate re-
sources toward public ends.  To the extent the system works as contem-
                                                                                                             
the expert status of committee members.  Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 301, 407, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78j-1, 7265.  It can be noted that these mandates implied little in the way of real world institutional 
adjustment.  Most large firms were organized with audit committees and compliance systems al-
ready, reflecting the influence of decades of self regulatory conversations about best governance 
practices.  National level audit committee mandates date from the Watergate era, albeit through the 
medium of exchange listing requirements.  Indeed, amendments to NYSE listing requirements, 
mooted in 2002 and approved in 2004, track the SOX audit committee provisions and extend them to 
the compensation and nominating committees before going on to the final redoubt of the boardroom 
to mandate a majority independent board.  See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL ¶ 303A. 
 125. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Fede-
ralism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 668 (2006). 
2010] Tracking Berle's Footsteps 873 
plated, it is because the corporation internalizes the public goal, working 
in co-operation with the government. 
Corporate deputization extends well beyond the mandatory disclo-
sure system and internal self-policing to external police work.  We have 
already seen this with the FCPA.  The “questionable payments” that mo-
tivated it had two parties, an American corporate payor and a foreign 
payee.  In forbidding the payments, the FCPA sought not only to assure 
domestic corporate cleanliness, but also to eliminate corruption in busi-
ness contexts abroad.  Subsequent legislation goes further.  For example, 
money laundering is a problem, and the criminals doing the laundering 
use bank accounts.  The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) accordingly requires 
banks to file “Suspicious Activity Reports” (SARs) with the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network of the Treasury Department whenever a 
transaction of $5,000 or more gives the bank reason to suspect that the 
transaction stems from, or disguises, illegal activities.126  Onerous obliga-
tions result.  The facts of a well-known Delaware case, Stone v. Ritter,127 
illustrate this.  Two miscreants working a Ponzi scheme used trust ac-
counts opened at one of AmSouth Bank’s 600 branches to direct 
proceeds to forty scheme participants.128  No SARs were filed.  Exposure 
of the scheme meant a criminal investigation of the bank, along with $40 
million in fines and $10 million of civil penalties.129  But it was not as if 
AmSouth lacked a compliance system.  Its board of directors promulgat-
ed and regularly amended a set of BSA policies.  It had a BSA Officer 
who made regular reports to the board and headed an office staffed with 
nineteen professionals.  AmSouth also had a Corporate Security Depart-
ment run by a former Secret Service officer and a Suspicious Activity 
Oversight Committee.130  We see that the BSA demands not merely co-
operation, but also effectiveness.  Failure to deliver means being held 
accountable, much as would be case with an officer in a law enforcement 
organization. 
Corporate deputization also occurs under other legal regimes, albeit 
in a less demanding form.  With environmental, tort, employment dis-
crimination, and health care law, the federal government avoids the flat 
out mandates of the FCPA, SOX, and the BSA in favor of a carrot-and-
stick approach.  Under this approach, the enterprise liability held out by 
the given legal regime is reduced or eliminated for those organizations 
that can demonstrate the existence of effective internal compliance struc-
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tures.131  The government in effect extends an invitation to cooperate, 
rewarding the companies that accept it. 
Corporate deputization, in short, has become a ubiquitous regulato-
ry tool.  More than a trace of The Modern Corporation’s last chapter sur-
vives as these arrangements proliferate.  We continue to harness corpora-
tions to serve public purposes, but as the last chapter predicted, we do so 
in a different political economic context.  The various mandates and car-
rots and sticks recall corporatist ideology: those who wield power in so-
ciety will be brought to the public table with the expectation that cooper-
ation will follow; punishment is held out for those who fail to cooperate 
with public directives. 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen that The Modern Corporation’s last chapter made 
four points.  First, to the extent that corporations wield significant eco-
nomic power, they inevitably will be the object of social demands made 
by the public.  Second, the demands will not register unless stated clearly 
and forcefully by the public to the state.  Third, the state must then for-
mulate regulatory instructions directed to corporations.  Fourth, the de-
mands’ content will vary with the particular political and social context. 
In this Article, we have expanded on the meaning of these points by 
reference to three successive political and social contexts, each viewed 
through the lens of Berle’s political economic vision of govern-
ment/corporate cooperation.  We looked first at the context in which the 
chapter was written.  At that time, Berle contemplated a new regime of 
intense government/corporate cooperation addressed to Depression con-
ditions, a regime thereafter realized when the NIRA set up a structure in 
which the government directly shaped corporate policy.  We then 
showed that Berle’s cooperative vision, reformulated as a political econ-
omy of the big stick regulatory era, survived and prospered despite the 
NIRA’s fast collapse.  We turned finally to the more recent period, in 
which Berle’s political economy dissipated as the economy became more 
competitive.  Here we show that Berle’s vision of government/corporate 
cooperation has survived his own political economy. 
The corporation’s success as an economic producer has turned it in-
to a ubiquitous institution to which the government turns for assistance in 
achieving its social welfare goals.  The government still harnesses the 
corporation as an agent for social change, employing a mixed strategy of 
mandate and cooperation as it does so.  The last chapter’s broad outline 
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thus retains its descriptive force.  The change goes not to the process of 
public demand, government response, or corporate cooperation, but to 
the set of issues to which the public addresses its demands.  
